



European Union Agency for the Cooperation  
of Energy Regulators

# ACER presentation for ERRA

EU Cybersecurity-related regulations: actual and  
potential tasks of NRAs

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ACER**

ERRA workshop, 21 February 2025



## **‘Actual and potential’ tasks**

Legislation either gives the task to the NRA explicitly or the NRA could be designated as an authority with specific tasks under that legislation.

## **‘Cybersecurity-related’**

Cybersecurity Network Code for Electricity

Risk Preparedness Regulation for Electricity



# Cybersecurity Network Code for Electricity (NCCS)

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# NCCS entered into force on 13 June 2024

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**NCCS is primarily a tool for developing more detailed rules**

It provides a governance model and objectives for the development of terms and conditions, methodologies and plans.

**Each Member State shall designate a competent authority to carry out the tasks assigned to it under the NCCS...**


Designation by 13 December 2024. Until the competent authority has been designated, the NRA shall carry out its tasks

**...including supervising 'high-impact' and 'critical impact' entities**

Such as TSOs, DSOs, suppliers, generators, aggregators, NEMOs, organised markets, balancing responsible parties, operators of recharging points and critical ICT service providers.



# Indicative timeline of H1 2025



# Tasks of NRAs under the NCCS

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## NRA task pursuant to the NCCS

Assess efficiency of cybersecurity investments, including:

- Risk mitigation
- Procurement integration
- Average company expenditure
- Average prices of cybersecurity services and products
- Existence of comparability of their costs and functions
- How cost-efficiency could be improved

## ACER supporting deliverable

Benchmarking guideline



CONSULTATION  
DRAFT

### CYBERSECURITY BENCHMARKING GUIDE

ACER guide pursuant to Article 13(1) of the Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/1366 of 11 March 2024 establishing a network code for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows

CONSULTATION DRAFT

## ACER Cybersecurity Task Force

Collaboration on the benchmarking guideline

Collaboration on the benchmarking exercise

## NRA task pursuant to the NCCS

Assess whether the NCCS compliance costs borne by the TSOs and the DSOs are reasonable, efficient and proportionate

If so, the TSOs and the DSOs will be able to recover them via network tariffs

## ACER Cybersecurity Task Force

Exchange best practices





## NRA task pursuant to the NCCS

Closely cooperate with ACER to develop a Union-level cybersecurity crisis management plan



## ACER Cybersecurity Task Force

Forum for cooperation with the NRAs in the development of the crisis management plan

Other stakeholders involved: ENISA, ENTSO-E, EU DSO entity, cybersecurity competent authorities, NCCS competent authorities, risk preparedness authorities and the national cyber crisis management authorities

	NCCS Article	Task
<b>Different scope from other committees</b>	10	Identifying problems and proposing improvements related to the implementation of the NCCS
	12(2)(b)	Identifying whether additional rules on common requirements, planning, monitoring, reporting and crisis management may be necessary to prevent risks for the electricity sector
	12(2)(c)	Identifying areas of improvement for the revision of the NCCS or determining uncovered areas and new priorities that may emerge due to technological developments
<b>Wide landscape of public and private sector stakeholders</b>		Once established, it would include NRA representatives

# Main tasks of NRAs if designated as NCCS Competent Authorities

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**Article 5** Cooperation between relevant authorities and bodies at national level

**Article 4(3), first sentence** Member States may allow their competent authority to delegate any NCCS task except for the tasks listed in Article 5



To be approved by all  
Competent Authorities in...

**TCMP**

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**...the EU**

Cybersecurity risk assessment methodologies (TSOs' proposal by 13 March 2025)

Cyber-attacks classification scale methodology (TSOs' proposal by 13 June 2025)

Minimum and advanced cybersecurity controls, including for the supply chain

Mapping of cybersecurity controls against standards

Comprehensive cross-border electricity cybersecurity risk assessment report

**...each relevant SOR**

Regional cybersecurity risk mitigation plans



**Designation of high-impact and critical-impact entities**

Using the Electricity Cybersecurity Impact Index. May also entity groups of entities

**Entities shall report to the Competent Authorities:**

Controls selected to address risks with their implementation status

Risk estimate for each Union-wide HI/CI process\* and relevant assets

ICT service providers for the CI processes

\*Could be, for example, TS or DS monitoring and control, protection against faults, operational security analysis, outage planning and coordination, schedule management, TS defence or restoration

## Entities will need to...

**...take into account procurement recommendations on, for example:**

Secure and controlled design, development and production of ICT products, services and processes, including their technical security

Support for security updates throughout the entire lifetime of these products

Traceability of the application of security specifications from development to delivery

**...and select suppliers that meet cybersecurity specifications**

These criteria will be developed under the NCCS as part of ICT procurement recommendations



## Cyber Resilience Act (Oct 2024)

### Cybersecurity requirements for products, including:

No known exploitable vulnerabilities, access management, secure default configuration, protection of data confidentiality (e.g. by encryption) and integrity, process availability and limitation of attack surfaces

### Manufacturers shall handle vulnerabilities, including:

Identify vulnerabilities, provide security updates, perform regular tests, publicise information about *fixed* vulnerabilities

### ‘Important products with digital elements’, such as:

Operating systems, identity and access management systems, network management systems, microprocessors, microcontrollers, IDS, IPS, routers and firewalls

### ‘Critical products with digital elements’

Includes smart meter gateways



## Additional means of supervision – only for critical-impact entities

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### **Demonstration of compliance**

Competent Authorities may request entities to demonstrate their compliance with the NCCS cybersecurity management system and controls.

### **National verification schemes**

Competent Authorities may establish them to verify the implementation of controls, standards and technical specifications ('mapping matrix').

May be based on an inspection by the Competent Authority, independent security audits or on mutual peer reviews by critical-impact entities supervised by the Competent Authority.

# Cyber-attacks, threats and vulnerabilities

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## If a Competent Authority receives such information...

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**Share it with CSIRTs and Competent Authorities in other Member States**

Within 24 hours and provide updates. Also try to correlate the information.

**Share with other entities within that Member State so they can defend themselves**

Within 24 hours, after anonymising and removing business secrets. Provide updates.

**May request that entity to share it with other entities that may be affected**

To generate situational awareness and to prevent a cross-border cybersecurity electricity incident

## If a Competent Authority receives information related to...

### Cyber threat

Forward it to the CSIRT

### Unpatched actively exploited vulnerability

Forward it to the CSIRT in the Member State  
where the vulnerability has been reported

In coordination with its CSIRTs, share any  
mitigation strategies



# Member State cybersecurity risk assessment

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# Member State cybersecurity risk assessment – every three years

## Primary inputs

## Outputs for the Member State report

High-impact and critical-impact entities' risk assessment reports

Implementation status of the cybersecurity controls

Risk preparedness plan under Art. 10 of Electricity Risk Preparedness Regulation

All cyber-attacks and summary of cyber threat information reported in the previous three years

For each Union-wide HI/CI process, risk estimate for information and related assets

Aggregate the information and submit the Member State risk assessment report to the ENTSO-E and the EU DSO entity



# Main tasks of NRAs if designated as Competent Authorities under Risk Preparedness Regulation 2019/941

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## Main tasks of NRAs if designated as Competent Authorities for Risk Preparedness

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**Assess all risks to security of electricity supply (Art. 4)**

Cooperate with TSOs, DSOs, NRAs, ENTSO-E and RCCs

**Identify national electricity crisis scenarios (Art. 7)**

Consistent with main risks identified under Reg 2019/941 and with regional electricity crisis scenarios identified by ENTSO-E (Art. 6)

**Establish risk-preparedness plans (Art. 10)**

Based on national and regional electricity crisis scenarios

Consists of national, bilateral and regional bilateral measures

**Recital 7, second sentence**

Ensure that cyber-incidents are properly identified as a risk, and that the countermeasures are properly reflected in the risk-preparedness plans

## NATIONAL MEASURES

## REGIONAL AND BILATERAL MEASURES

Responsibilities of the competent authority

Crisis coordinator

National measures mitigating risks identified in national and regional crisis scenarios

Cooperation and information sharing mechanisms

National crisis coordinator and its tasks

Coordinated measures to mitigate an electricity crisis

Detailed procedures to be followed, including information flows

Procedures for carrying out annual or biennial tests of the risk-preparedness plans

Market and non-market measures

Triggers for non-market-based measures

Framework for manual load shedding



# Going back to the tasks of the NCCS Competent Authorities...

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## Article 41(2) of the NCCS

‘(...) each competent authority shall develop a national cybersecurity crisis management and response plan for cross-border electricity flows taking into account:

- the **Union-level cybersecurity crisis management plan** [established by ACER prior to that] and
- the **national risk preparedness plan established** in accordance with Article 10 of Regulation (EU) 2019/941.’



## If an electricity crisis is related to a cyber-attack impacting more than one Member State...

### Create an ad hoc cross-border crisis coordination group

Consisting of the NCCS Competent Authorities, Cybersecurity Authorities, Cyber Crisis Management Authorities and Risk Preparedness Authorities

### This ad hoc group shall:

Coordinate retrieval and dissemination of information to the entities involved

Organise communication between the entities and the competent authorities

In cooperation with the CSIRTs, assist the entities with mitigation


### Large-scale cybersecurity incident?

Additionally, inform and support the EU CyCLONe



# Cybersecurity exercises, every three years

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## Article 17 of the NCCS

ACER, in cooperation with each NCCS Competent Authority, shall monitor:

- implementation of cybersecurity risk management measures by the entities
- reporting of risk assessments by the entities
- reporting of cyber-attacks and threats by the entities
- adoption and implementation progress of the TCMPs



# Temporary provisions

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## Tasks of the Competent Authorities in the provisional period

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|-----------------------------|--|
| <b>By 13 September 2024</b> | Provide a list of national legislation with relevance for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows to the ENTSO-E and the EU DSO entity |
| <b>By 13 February 2025</b>  | Identify candidates for HI/CI entities   |
| <b>By 13 March 2025</b>     | Notify the candidates  |

Thank you

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