

Presentation of the ERRA EMER COM Report (2025) «Grid investments: Regulatory Evaluation and Incentives»

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- **Short history** of ERRA / EMER reports on (grid) investments
- **Survey, participation** and in-depth case studies
- **Findings and «takeaways»** /1st part: regulatory evaluation of grid plans submitted to regulators
- **Findings and «takeaways»** /2nd part: regulatory incentives for timely/efficient investment execution
- **Summary of Case studies**
- **Eight final recommendations**

EMER 2024 Report on investments

- The EMER Committees issued in May 2024 its first Report on investments


Investment regulation evaluation, approval and risk mitigation approaches for large investment projects, obstacle to investments

- This report is available on the ERRA website
- Content: **not only grid** investments
 - Approvals and evaluations in energy investment projects*
 - Overlap regulatory, policy & approval*
 - Regulation of investments in energy generation*
 - Incentives to attract investments in energy generation*
 - Treatment and planning*
 - Approval of investment projects and development plans*
 - Monitoring*



ERRA 2024 Report on «grid scarcity»

- “Grids risk becoming the **weak link** of clean energy transitions” (IEA 2023)
- As the issue becomes more apparent also among ERRA member countries, the Association issues the Study on how **grid scarcity** is perceived among ERRA regulators and how the issue can be tackled with an adequate **regulatory toolbox**
- **ERRA survey** results for 11 member countries
- **Case studies** on:
 - cable pooling in Poland,
 - grid transparency in Belgium,
 - competitive renewable energy zones in Texas.




ERRA 2024 Report on «grid scarcity»




Main messages:

0. No-regret option: Make **Better Use** of Existing Grids
1. Comprehensive **Network Planning**
2. **Incentives** for Investment Execution



EMER 2025 Report on «grid investments»

- Focus on topic raised by grid scarcity report:
 - regulatory assessment of grid plans submitted by grid operators and **how regulators evaluate proposed investments**
 - regulatory **incentives for investments execution** (timeliness and efficiency).
- **Survey of practices** in 13 Erra Members
- Five in-depth **case studies**
 - Armenia: DSO long-term planning
 - France: incentives for timely/efficient execution (TSO)
 - Georgia: comprehensive grid plan assessment
 - North Macedonia: tariff incentives (recognition at investment approval and monitoring)
 - Rhode Island: investment approval & monitoring



Survey: two main parts

*Sections of the «**Grid plan assessment**» part of the survey*

- 1) **Investment evaluation process**
- 2) **Size threshold for evaluation**
- 3) **Cost benefit analysis**
- 4) **Scenarios and treatment of uncertainty**
- 5) **Stakeholder engagement**

*Sections of the «**Investment incentives**» part of the survey*

- 6) **Financiability of planned investments**
- 7) **Incentives for timeliness of execution**
- 8) **Incentives for efficiency of execution and other incentives**
- 9) **Monitoring of investment execution after their approval**

For each section a few questions (both multiple choice and open answers) have been prepared with the help of Chairs

Survey and case studies participation


Regulatory Diversity

survey and case studies are on both EU and non-EU countries

| EU | | | Non-EU | | |
|---|------------------|---|---|--------------------------|---|
| Country | Organisation | | Country | Organisation | |
|  | Austria | Energie-Control (E-Control) |  | Albania | Albanian Energy Regulatory Authority (ERE) |
|  | France | Commission de Regulation de l'Energie (CRE) |  | Armenia | Public Services Regulatory Commission (PSRC) |
|  | Hungary | Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority (MEKH) |  | Georgia | Georgian Energy and Water Supply Regulatory Commission (GNERC) |
|  | Latvia | Public Utilities Commission (PUC) |  | Moldova | National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE) |
|  | Lithuania | National Energy Regulatory Council (NERC) |  | North Macedonia | Energy, Water Services and Municipal Waste Management Regulatory Commission (ERC) |
|  | Romania | Romanian Energy Regulatory Authority (ANRE) |  | Oman | Authority for Public Services Regulation (APSR) |
| | | |  | Saudi Arabia | Saudi Electricity Regulatory Authority (SERA) |
| | | |  | Türkiye | Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) |
| | | |  | Rhode Island (US) | Public Utility Commission Rhode Island (PUC-RI) |


EMER 2025 Report: the context

- Electricity grids face **simultaneous challenges** of renewable integration, growing demand, and reliability requirements across both T and D levels.
- New technologies offer solutions for **optimizing existing infrastructure** while enabling DSM and RES integration.
- Regulatory frameworks must balance **enabling necessary investments** with protecting consumers from unnecessary costs.
- **Cost-benefit analysis frameworks** are evolving to capture broader economic, environmental, and social benefits.
- Effective **stakeholder engagement** throughout the planning process is recognized as essential for successful grid development.




EMER 2025 Report: a reference framework

- Modern grid planning must **address both conventional infrastructure needs and emerging technological solutions** through robust yet flexible assessment frameworks.
- **Project categorization** can provide a **structured approach** to evaluating infrastructure against **appropriate criteria**.
- **Risk assessment** must now consider climate change impacts, cybersecurity threats, and technology evolution alongside traditional technical and financial risks.
- Regional coordination is essential for **cross-border projects**, requiring sophisticated frameworks for cost allocation and benefit sharing.
- **Regulatory oversight** must balance providing certainty for project developers with maintaining flexibility to adapt to **changing circumstances**.




EMER 2025 Report: takeaways /1st part


- Most jurisdictions have established well-structured, legally-based processes for evaluating grid investments
- In almost all cases (but one) of the survey sample, grid plans are also approved by the relevant regulatory authority – both at T and D level



TSO Process Formalized:



Legal Basis TSO Process:



DSO Process Formalized:



Legal Basis DSO process

EMER 2025 Report: takeaways /1st part

- Core **content requirements of grid plans** to be submitted to regulators for their assessment (infrastructure descriptions, costs, timelines) are consistent across jurisdictions, while more advanced elements (RES integration, environmental impacts) vary significantly
- **Case studies:** Armenia (see paragraph 5.1) and Georgia (see paragraph 5.3)

Overview of Template Requirements

| Country | TSO Template Approved | DSO Template Approved | Template Format |
|----------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Albania | No | No | Company defined |
| Armenia | No | No | Company defined |
| Austria | Yes | No | Regulator defined (TSO only) |
| Georgia | Yes | Yes | Regulator defined |
| Hungary | Yes | Yes | Regulator defined |
| Latvia | Yes | Yes | Regulator defined |
| Lithuania | Yes | Yes | Regulator defined |
| Moldova | Yes | Yes | Regulator defined |
| N. Macedonia | Yes | Yes | Regulator defined |
| Oman | Yes | Yes | Regulator defined |
| Romania | Yes | Yes | Regulator defined |
| Saudi Arabia | Yes | Yes | Regulator defined |
| Türkiye | No | Yes | Regulator defined (DSO only) |
| Summary | Yes: 10/13 No: 3/13 | Yes: 10/13 No: 3/13 | |

Table 2: Regulatory templates for grid plans

EMER 2025 Report: takeaways /1st part

- **CBA implementation** varies widely, from comprehensive frameworks to ad hoc analyses, with substantial differences in **triggering thresholds**.

| Country | CBA Status | Methodology Definition | Methodology Owner |
|--------------|------------|---|-----------------------------------|
| Albania | Ad hoc | Not clearly defined | Network operators |
| Armenia | - | Not used for power grid investments | - |
| Austria | No CBA (*) | Used only for PCIs | Entso-e |
| Georgia | Yes | Regulator sets the methodology | Regulator |
| Hungary | No CBA (*) | Used only for PCIs | Entso-e |
| Latvia | No CBA (*) | Used so far only for PCIs; planned for 2025 | (Regulator in the next future) |
| Lithuania | Yes | Regulator sets the methodology | Regulator |
| Moldova | Yes | Defined in regulation, according to investment categorization | Regulator |
| N. Macedonia | Yes | Based on project cost, but not structured method | Network operators |
| Oman | Yes | Requirements of CBA methodology are set by regulator | TSO proposes / regulator approves |
| Romania | Ad hoc | Not clearly defined | Network operators |
| Saudi Arabia | Ad hoc | Not clearly defined | Network operators |
| Türkiye | - | Not used for power grid investments | - |

(*) Entso-e CBA methodology used for Projects of Common Interest (PCIs)

Table 3: Cost-benefit analysis

| Country | Threshold Value | Basis |
|--------------------------|---|---|
| N. Macedonia | €100,000 | Economic efficiency required above this threshold |
| Georgia | 5M GEL (≈€1.7M) for TSO, 1M GEL (≈€0.33M) for DSO | Detailed analysis required above this threshold |
| Oman | 20M Omani Rials (≈€50M) for transmission projects | This threshold applies to Project Delivery Incentive scheme |
| Lithuania | Electricity: €3.5 M for TSO, €1.5 M for DSO | Assessment based on project category system |
| Saudi Arabia | TSO/DSO conduct CBA for all projects. | Regulator review projects based on random sampling; above 500 M SAR (≈€125M) transmission projects are automatically selected |
| Latvia, Hungary, Austria | No threshold specified | CBA only for cross border PCIs |
| Romania | No threshold specified | Sample analysis of at least 20% of projects, totalling 30% of investment value |
| Moldova | No threshold specified | Assessment based on project category system (8 categories) |
| Albania | No threshold specified | Network operators perform ad hoc economic analysis |
| Armenia, Türkiye | No threshold specified | No CBA required for grid investments |

Table 6: Thresholds for CBA

EMER 2025 Report: takeaways /1st part

- **Multiple scenario planning** and uncertainty analysis remain underdeveloped, with most countries focusing on short to medium-term horizons (3-10 years). Long-term planning still largely non practiced
- As for **sensitivity analysis**, countries commonly focus on the following parameters:
 - Demand forecasts
 - Renewable energy penetration
 - Commodity prices
 - Import/export scenarios




Figure 6: Use of scenarios

EMER 2025 Report: takeaways /1st part

- **Stakeholder consultation** is common practice, though duration requirements vary from 30 days to 6 months, with limited stakeholder participation frequently reported as a challenge.





Figure 7: Duration of consultations

EMER 2025 Report: takeaways /2nd part

- **Financial viability assessment** is required by most regulators as a prerequisite for project approval, although in some cases the approval of the grid plan is fully distinct from the financial justification of investments
- Approaches to **tariff recognition** range from at-approval to at-commissioning.
- **Case studies:** North Macedonia and Rhode Island (US)

| Country | Financial Substantiation Required | Type of Information Required |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|---|
| Albania | Yes | Feasibility studies |
| Armenia | No | TSO not required to demonstrate financial resources |
| Austria | Yes | Medium-term investment planning |
| Georgia | Yes | Documentation of financial sources and relevant information |
| Hungary | No | Approving an investment in NDP does not result in automatically approving the investment costs in tariff. TSO provides information but formal substantiation not required |
| Latvia | Yes | Tabular forms with sources of financing |
| Lithuania | Yes | Sources of financing and financial appraisal |
| Moldova | Yes | Sources of finance for each project |
| N. Macedonia | Yes | Data on planned investments with financing sources |
| Oman | Yes | Information provided during price control review |
| Romania | No | TSO provides information but formal substantiation not required |
| Saudi Arabia | No | TSO provides all data via a single process (Revenue Requirement Determination) |
| Türkiye | No | Regulators not involved with financial sources, but monitor financial ratios of network operators |
| SUMMARY | Yes: 9/13 No: 4/13 | |

Table 7: Financial viability and information required

EMER 2025 Report: takeaways /2nd part

- **Advanced incentive frameworks** for timeliness and efficiency remain limited, with notable examples
- **Incentives** can be bi-lateral (bonus and penalty) or mono-lateral (penalty only; not found in the sample examples of bonus-only incentive mechanisms)
- **Case studies:** Oman's PDI scheme (see paragraph 4.2) and France's case study (see paragraph 5.2)

| Country | Formalized control of timely execution | Timeliness Incentive/penalty | Efficiency control and incentive/penalty |
|----------------|--|--|---|
| Albania | No | No | No |
| Armenia | No | No | Yes |
| Austria | No | Yes (bonus & penalty) | Yes (standard costs) |
| Georgia | Yes | No | Yes (assessment system) |
| Hungary | Yes | No | No |
| Latvia | No | Yes (penalty only) | No |
| Lithuania | Yes | Yes (penalty only) | Yes (expert assessment) |
| Moldova | No | No | No |
| N. Macedonia | No | Yes (penalty only) | No |
| Oman | Yes | Yes (penalty only) | Yes (ex post assessment; possible RAB reductions) |
| Romania | No | No | Yes (output-based) |
| Saudi Arabia | Yes | No | No |
| Türkiye | Yes | Yes (bonus & penalty) | Yes (unit cost approach) |
| SUMMARY | Yes: 6/13 No: 7/13 | Yes (bonus & penalty): 2/13 Yes (only penalty): 4/13 No: 7/13 | Yes (various means): 6/13 No: 7/13 |

Table 9: Regulatory mechanisms for timely and efficient execution

EMER 2025 Report: takeaways /2nd part

- **Monitoring frameworks include** processes for plan amending (cost/time variation) and regular reporting requirements
- The balance between regulatory oversight and operator **flexibility remains a key challenge** in investment monitoring frameworks.


| Country | Amendment Procedure | Key Features |
|----------------|--------------------------|--|
| Albania | Yes | Annual updates |
| Armenia | Yes | Changes to be submitted by November 1 |
| Austria | Yes | Updates every two years |
| Georgia | Yes | 10% value change threshold requires amendment |
| Hungary | No | Yearly planning is a cyclic exercise; annual NDP serves as monitoring exercise |
| Latvia | Yes | Evaluation for significant cost changes |
| Lithuania | Yes | 10% cost deviation threshold |
| Moldova | Yes | Two amendment requests permitted annually (deadline: November 1) |
| N. Macedonia | No | No formal procedure reported |
| Oman | Yes | Internal gate process for variations. If changes are significant, TSO re-submits the project and it is reviewed by regulator |
| Romania | Yes | Amendments allowed until October 1; 80% of previous projects must remain |
| Saudi Arabia | Yes | If changes are beyond certain ranges, TSO re-submits the project and it is reviewed |
| Türkiye | Yes | Approval is required for budget revisions |
| SUMMARY | Yes: 11 No: 2 | |

Table 10: Procedures for amending the grid plan


EMER 2025 Report: case studies



| COUNTRY | TOPIC |
|-------------------|--|
| Armenia | Regulatory mandate for DSO long term planning, resulting in progressive improvement in level of network losses and reliability |
| France | Incentive mechanism for Transmission investments, with milestones and sharing mechanism of saving in respect of unit cost |
| Georgia | Comprehensive regulatory framework for grid plan assessment at both T and D level, with project categorization |
| North Macedonia | Tariff recognition of investment at approval ad hoc incentive with ex-post monitoring and adjustment in case of non-execution |
| Rhode Island (US) | Regulatory mechanism (ISR: safety, reliability investments) allowing utilities to recover these cost without regulatory lag |




1. GRID OPTIMISATION Prioritize efficient use of existing infrastructure through Grid Enhancing Technologies (GETs) and other measures before expanding networks




2. STANDARDISED ASSESSMENT Implement structured templates for grid plans with clear minimum requirements for both TSOs and DSOs



3. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS develop proportionate CBA frameworks with appropriate thresholds and standardized methodologies for multiple benefit categories




4. SCENARIO PLANNING Enhance long-term planning with multiple scenarios to address fundamental uncertainty and cross-sectoral integration



5. STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT Strengthen consultation processes with adequate duration and multiple engagement methods



6. INVESTMENT RECOGNITION Design tariff treatment approaches that balance risk allocation while incentivizing timely implementation



7. EXECUTION INCENTIVES Implement balanced mechanisms with reasonable deadbands for timelines and reference costs for efficiency



8. MONITORING SYSTEMS Establish monitoring frameworks with clear amendment thresholds and regular reporting requirements



**THANK YOU
FOR YOUR ATTENTION!**

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